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Abstract: One of the most significant threats faced by enterprise networks today is 
from Bots. A Bot is a program that operates as an agent for a user and runs automated 
tasks over the internet, at a much higher rate than would be possible for a human alone. 
A collection of Bots in a network, used for malicious purposes is referred to as a Botnet. 
Bot attacks can range from localized attacks like key-logging to network intensive 
attacks like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). In this paper, we suggest a novel 
approach that can detect and combat Bots. The proposed solution adopts a two pronged 
strategy which we have classified into the standalone algorithm and the network 
algorithm. The standalone algorithm runs independently on each node of the network. It 
monitors the active processes on the node and tries to identify Bot processes using 
parameters such as response time and output to input traffic ratio. If a suspicious 
process has been identified the network algorithm is triggered. The network algorithm 
will then analyze conversations to and from the hosts of the network using the transport 
layer flow records. It then tries to deduce the Bot pattern as well as Bot signatures 
which can subsequently be used by the standalone algorithm to thwart Bot processes at 
their very onset. 
 
Keywords: Bot; Botnets; flow_data; two pronged approach;  Distributed Denial of 
Service; IRC Bots; Standalone Algorithm; Network Algorithm;  Dynamic Time 
Warping . 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
1.1Background 
Commercial as well as governmental organizations 
are increasingly relying on computer networks to share and 
process important data. A significant threat to any network 
is the presence of Botnets. Botnets are considered as 
compromised computers which can be present anywhere 
from homes, schools, businesses and even governments 
around the world. They work under the control of a single 
hacker, commonly known as a Bot-master. Botnets are 
often used to conduct attacks ranging from Distributed 
Denial of Service to corporate intelligence or surveillance 
and spam delivery. The Botnets have emerged as the 
number one source of spam over the past years, giving 
spammers access to virtually unlimited bandwidth.  
 
Spammers do not pay for the messages they send, and 
hence can e-mail larger documents, like image files 
(Zhijun Liu et. al., 2005; Fulu Li, Mo-Han Hsieh, 2006; 
Husain Husna et. al., 2008). 
 Botnets have come to flood the Internet, largely 
unnoticed by the public. On a typical day, large number of 
computers connected to the internet is Bots engaged in 
distributing e-mail spam, stealing sensitive data typed at 
banking and shopping websites, bombarding websites as 
part of extortionist Denial of Service attacks, and spreading 
fresh infections. IRC bots have been used for infecting 
hosts by installing malicious code on them (Zhenhua Chi, 
Zixiang Zhao 2007; Zhijun Liu et. al., 2005). DDoS and 
other network based attacks render services hosted in a 
particular network unresponsive and unusable as in case of 
UDP flood attack. These kinds of attack reduce the 
throughput of the network as a whole. Trinoo, a DDoS 
attack is capable of compromising thousands of hosts in a 
given network (David Dittrich, 1999).  
 
1.2 Related work 
 Most of the previous researches done to combat 
Bots have been centered on the Botnets that follow the 
C&C (commands & control) model where Bot-masters 
mainly use the IRC protocol to invoke commands for Bots. 
In this model a single Bot-master controls all the Bots of a 
network. Thus, it is not very difficult to thwart the Botnet as 
only the Bot-master needs to be traced. Unfortunately, most 
of the recent Botnets have migrated to the P2P (peer to 
peer) architecture (David Dagon et. al., 2007; Craig A. 
Schiller, Jim Binkley 2007). This model has a greater 
capability of regeneration as there is no single point of 
control and hence it is more dangerous (Ping Wang, Sherri 
Sparks, Cliff C. Zou 2007). Most of the previous attempts 
to detect and combat Bots have focused on a limited set of 
attacks and the analysis for the same were performed based 
on the presumption that the network is infected by only 
those attacks. In (Akiyama et al., 2007; Al-Hammadi and 
Aickelin, 2008; Lei Liu et al., 2008; Stéphane Racine, 2003-
04; Wicherski et al., 2005; Georg Wicherski et. al., 2005; 
Niels Provos, Thorsten Holz 2007), suggested approaches 
and analysis are based on Botnets that follow C&C model 
and typically use IRC protocol. Also these approaches 
provide supervised learning as they try to analyze Bot 
activities based on certain predefined properties and Bot 
lifecycles (M.A. Rajab, J. Zarfoss, F. Monrose, A. Terzis 
2006). In (Guofei Gu et. al., 2008), the adopted approach 
tries to analyze traffic patterns generically. However it is a 
passive approach to detecting Botnets. 
Figure 1 below shows the layout of a typical Botnet. We 
would be using the terminologies mentioned in this figure, 
attacker, master and agent, for the remaining sections of 
the paper. 
 
Figure 1 Representation of a Botnet. 
 
 
 
Attacker: initiates and controls the attack 
Master: compromised host that controls the agents and 
invokes commands 
Agent: bots that perform P2P attacks on victims based on 
commands invoked by master  
The contribution of our work is as follows: 
 A two pronged approach towards detecting Botnets. 
An algorithm that based on standalone host activity 
analysis triggers a network analysis to find Botnets in 
the given network. 
 A method for identifying similarities between filtered 
Bot traffic using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) 
algorithm, K-means clustering and graphical analysis.  
 We also present an experimental simulation of UDP 
flood attack and perform analytical calculations on 
UDP packet flows retrieved from the same, based on 
the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm.  
 
 Our solution does not assume the existence of a 
particular type of Bot and is hence generic. It can deal with 
both C&C and P2P Bots because of our two pronged 
approach. The advantage of our solution is that it can evolve 
to identify new Bot patterns thus making it a learning based 
approach. The chances of false positives are also reduced 
because of the two pronged strategy adopted.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 explains the data structure that we use for 
network traffic flow collection, Sections 3, 4 explain our 
solution which comprises of Stand Alone and Network 
Algorithm. These sections also include required 
experimental analysis. In Section 5 we summarize our work 
 followed by the future work and references in Section 6 and 
7 respectively. 
 
2. Data Collection and Flow representation 
 
In order to detect malicious and abnormal activities 
in a network we use a data structure, flow_data, to store 
network activity of each host over a fixed interval of time. 
For each host, we maintain an array of flow_data, 
flow_data_array, such that flow_data_array[i] represents 
the captured flow_data in the i
th
 time interval. The 
flow_data_array not only gives us a snapshot of the 
network activity for a single host but also a combined view 
of the network as a whole (when flow_data_array from all 
hosts in the network is considered). The data structure 
definition is as follows: 
  
struct address 
{ 
string ip_address; 
int port; 
} 
 
struct flow_data 
{ 
string  packet_type ;  
map<address, long> hostwise_weight_incoming; 
map<address, long> hostwise_weight_outgoing; 
float avg_response_time; 
int icmp_errors; 
}; 
flow_data [] flow_data_array; 
hostwise_weight_incoming represents the mapping of hosts 
(for a particular port) to incoming traffic volume and 
hostwise_weight_outgoing  is used for the host to outgoing 
traffic volume mapping. Using flow_data_array for all hosts 
in the network, we can construct a weighted (directed) graph 
to find abnormal, malicious activities in the network. We 
use the weighted (directed) graph, for network activity 
analysis, in the network algorithm. 
  It is important to note that we maintain both 
hostwise_weight_incoming and hostwise_weight_outgoing 
for calculating O/I ratio and for similar analytical 
calculations in the standalone algorithm. Other parameters 
included are packet_type (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.), 
icmp_errors number of ICMP error packets and 
avg_response_time. In the remaining sections we will use 
flow_data to represent the network traffic flow capture and 
flow_data_array to represent the collection of flow_data 
captures over multiple time intervals. 
 
3. Stand-Alone Algorithm 
 As we have mentioned, our solution adopts a two 
pronged approach. We will refer to the first phase of our 
solution as the Stand-Alone Algorithm primarily because 
this algorithm runs independently on each node of the 
network. The main objective of the algorithm is to monitor 
active processes on a given node and identify Bot/suspicious 
processes by evaluating the packets being sent and received 
by that process along with other relevant parameters such as 
response time, output to input traffic ratio, APIs invoked 
etc. In order to simplify the explanation of our algorithm we 
have established various states that a monitored process 
might be in as the algorithm progresses. The algorithm 
begins as soon as the computer boots with all scheduled 
processes being in the initial state.  Once a process begins 
execution, it enters the execution state and we begin to 
monitor its activities. If we find the activities to be 
suspicious, the process is updated for its status as 
“SUSPECT” and then moved to a specially designed task 
manager, which assigns the process a lower priority and 
keeps a tab on the system resources that the process is 
utilizing. However, normal processes will continue to 
remain in the execution state and will eventually migrate to 
the terminate state when the processes end. For each 
suspicious process, a suspicion value is calculated. If this 
value exceeds our thresh-hold value, the network algorithm 
is triggered. We will now explain the methodology for 
calculating the suspicion value and the rationale behind it.  
 We calculate the suspicion value based on certain 
parameters which are as follows: 
 
Response Time: This is the elapsed time between the 
submission of a request and the beginning of a response 
from a particular host. The analysis of this parameter is 
based on the type of attack, as follows: 
IRC Bot: IRC Bots are developed using an event based 
framework wherein Bots invoke commands like MSG, 
ACTION, ECHO and JOIN in response to events/actions 
like TEXT, JOIN, CHAT, and PART. IRC Bots are 
programmed to respond to events/actions either 
instantaneously or after a fixed amount of time. 
Events/actions for Bots include a user entering a text 
(TEXT) or a user joining an IRC channel (JOIN), response 
to which can be; displaying a message on the IRC channel 
or performing some other actions depending on the event. 
 
A simple IRC Bot script is as follows: 
on 1 : TEXT : Hello : #mIRC : { 
 /msg $chan Hello…..! 
} 
In such a scenario, the response time between an 
incoming IRC packet (a comment/event packet to notify an 
activity in the channel) and an outgoing IRC response 
packet is very small. A simulated IRC Bot execution 
showed that the time gap between an incoming IRC event 
request and the corresponding response is ~221 ms. 
DDoS attack: Network based attacks like DDoS attack are 
organized in terms of the architecture of the various 
compromised hosts involved in the attack as shown in 
Figure 1. The response time between an attacker issuing a 
command to the master and the master responding to the 
same is very less (in the order of milliseconds). Similar is 
the case between the master and the agents. Other network 
based attacks like Ping of Death, Smurf attack and Spam 
attack follow similar traits as far as response time is 
concerned. 
We keep track of the average response time for 
individual hosts to identify potentially compromised hosts 
(Bots) with low values for response time (as compared to 
 221ms). This can be achieved by evaluating 
avg_response_time field of flow_data for individual hosts. 
  
IP Address:  We check the source IP address of incoming 
packets and the destination IP address of outgoing packets 
to determine whether any of these IP address have 
previously been blacklisted by the network algorithm due to 
suspicious activities at the corresponding nodes. We also 
filter out IP addresses of legitimate hosts like servers 
hosting standard service in the network (Guofei Gu et. al., 
2008). 
 
Network Traffic Pattern: Bots engaging in different type 
of attacks such as spam attack, DDoS attack and key 
logging attack produce network traffic following a 
particular pattern (James R. Binkley, Suresh Singh 2006; 
Guofei Gu, Junjie Zhang, and Wenke Lee 2008; Yousof Al-
Hammadi and Uwe Aickelin 2008; Jae-Seo Lee et.al., 2008; 
Anestis Karasaridis, Brian Rexroad, David Hoeflin 2007; 
Mitsuaki Akiyama et. al., 2007).  
 
We use the following characteristics for determining a 
malicious network traffic pattern: 
 Consecutive packets sent by the Bot process having 
identical values in the protocol header fields. DDoS 
attack for example involves a flood of packets having 
the same destination IP address, protocol (TCP, UDP, 
ICMP or IRC based on the type of attack the Bot is 
attempting) and protocol header field values. 
 Intermittent peaks in the network IO graph for hosts in 
the network. 
 High volume of outgoing TCP, UDP packets in 
response to minimal but controlled incoming network 
traffic. 
A simulated execution of an IRC Bot showed controlled 
outgoing IRC traffic only in response to certain specific 
incoming IRC packets with a very small and almost 
constant response time.  
 
Figure 2 IRC traffic flow capture for IRC Bot. 
 
 
A snapshot of the IRC traffic flow captured is shown in 
Figure 2, above. 
The time specified in the above figure has the 
following format: 
<packet-sequence>.<time in milliseconds> 
Entries with same packet-sequence value represent the 
following sequence: 
o Notification from the IRC server to the IRC Bot for an 
action in the IRC channel. 
o A request initiated from the IRC Bot in response to the 
notification received from the IRC server. 
It is important to note that these patterns are 
instrumental to not only detect Bots but also to detect the 
Bot-master (attacker). We keep a track of hosts following 
the below mentioned patterns: 
 A low response time 
 High volume of TCP SYN packets  
 High volume of TCP , UDP packets 
 Regular TCP, UDP packets having Bot commands, as 
mentioned in (David Dittrich, 1999), in the payload. 
 
Ports Used for Communication: Most Bots use particular 
ports as endpoints of communication. These ports can give 
an indication of the kind of attack a Bot might be engaging 
in because typically Bots use different ports for different 
type of attacks. For example IRC Bots use port 6667.  
For network oriented attacks like DDoS, Spam, Tear 
Drop and Smurf attack there are multiple ports that are used 
depending on whether the conversation is between the 
attacker and master or master and agent or agent and 
victim. And the ports used depend on the results of the 
network scanning phase.  
We keep track of the traffic flow on standard Bot ports 
and also keep track of open ports on network hosts that can 
be potentially used by Bot-masters to invoke commands to 
Bots. 
 
Continuous Attempts for Connection Setups: As Bots 
try to propagate across the network, Bot processes need to 
continuously establish connections with other nodes in the 
network. Most of the IRC chat servers keep a flooding limit 
for participants on the channel. This leads to frequent 
disconnections from IRC channels for IRC Bots and 
subsequent connection attempts. 
A DDoS attack also involves a lot of connection attempts 
and failures during the network scanning phase. Thus, by 
keeping a tab on the frequency at which connection attempts 
are being made by a process, we can probabilistically 
determine if the concerned process is a Bot process using 
(Ourmon - network monitoring and anomaly detection 
system). We also keep track of UDP work weight, (Binkley 
and Parekh, 2009) for potentially compromised hosts. UDP 
work weight roughly measures the amount of network noise 
caused by a host (Binkley and Parekh, 2009). A high value 
for UDP work weight is indicative of a Bot host. UDP work 
weight calculation for a simulated UDP flood attack for one 
of the compromised host is as follows: 
 
 
SENT (UDP packets sent from the host) = 2649 packets 
RECV (UDP packets received on the host) = 561 packets 
ICMPErrors (Incoming ICMP error packets) = 1927 packets 
  
UDP work weight =  
(SENT x ICMPErrors) + RECV = 5105184    (Binkley and 
Parekh, 2009)   
 
 
High UDP work weight in this case indicates a host 
trying to scan a large network as fast as possible or involved 
in a DDoS attack. 
 
Number of Active Connection: A Bot process typically 
has a high number of active TCP connections through which 
it sends and receives packets. Bot-masters/attackers use 
these active connections to invoke commands, as mentioned 
in (David Dittrich, 1999), on compromised hosts (Agents) to 
perform certain actions. Hence it is an important parameter 
in determining the suspicion value. A high value for 
hostwise_weight_incoming on Bots, victim hosts and a 
high value for hostwise_weight_outgoing on attacker hosts 
indicate a potential Bot activity. 
 
Output to Input Traffic Ratio (O/I Ratio): This is the 
ratio of the total outgoing traffic from a process to the total 
incoming traffic for that particular process. This parameter 
is useful in identifying the kind of attack a Bot process 
might be engaging in. For example, the O/I Ratio for Bots 
involved in spam or DDoS attack is very high while for key-
logging Bots the O/I Ratio is very low.  
Snapshot of network activity during the infection phase of a 
simulated DDoS attack is as below: 
  
 
Figure 3 Outgoing TCP traffic from one of the Bots/attacker 
involved in DDoS attack. 
 
 
 
 
Thus a high O/I ratio for a host is indicative of 
Bots activity. This again can be calculated using the 
hostwise_weight_incoming and hostwise_weight_outgoing 
fields of flow_data. 
 It must be noted that these parameters are applied 
to the incoming as well as outgoing traffic of a process. 
Moreover, not only do these parameter help us determine 
whether a process is suspicious or not but they also help us 
classify the suspicious process into one of the three 
categories, based on the possible kind of attack that the 
process is carrying out. These categories are Key-logging, 
DDoS and Spam. The suspicion value is a weighted average 
of the computed numeric values for the above parameters. 
In the next phase, the Stand-Alone Algorithm carries out 
further analyses of the suspicious processes based on the 
category into which they have been classified. The three 
possible analyses are as follows:  
 
 For a process which has been classified into the key-
logging category, we start monitoring the API 
functions that the process is invoking. We are mainly 
concerned with three kinds of functions which are; 
communication functions, file access functions and 
keyboard-state functions. The objective of a key-
logging Bot is to keep a tab on all the keys being 
pressed on the target machine and convey this 
information to the Bot-master. We use Spearman‟s 
rank correlation to conclusively determine whether the 
process is a key-logging Bot or not (Yousof Al-
Hammadi and Uwe Aickelin, 2008). Spearman‟s rank 
correlation, used in statistical analysis, assesses how 
well the relationship between two variables can be 
described using a monotonic function (Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient). We determine the 
spearman rank correlation coefficient amongst the 
frequency of invocations of the three types of API 
functions mentioned above. 
 For a process which has been classified into the DDoS 
category, we start evaluating the process activities in 
order to identify the kind of DDoS attack. For 
instance, in case of the Ping of Death Attack the Bot 
will generate ping packets which are exceptionally 
large in size. Thus we can detect this attack by 
checking the size of the outgoing ping packets. The 
other kinds of DDoS attacks that the Stand-Alone 
Algorithm can detect are Flood Attack, SYN attacks, 
Tear Drop Attack and Smurf Attack. The details of 
detection have been omitted here for the sake of 
brevity.  
 For a process which has been classified into the SPAM 
category we evaluate its traffic characteristics. We 
perform a contextual analysis which scans the message 
body in order to identify certain markers which are 
known to be associated with spam. Similarly, we also 
check for message similarity across consecutive 
messages. Based on this analysis, we try to 
conclusively determine whether the suspicious process 
is really engaging in a spam attack or not.  
 
 
In the last stage of the Stand-Alone Algorithm, we 
perform the Process Log Analysis. This analysis is based 
only on the kind of APIs a process is invoking and their 
corresponding timestamp. The objective is to evaluate the 
type and frequency of the various API functions invoked 
by a process during its lifetime in order to identify a 
definitive pattern which will help us to determine not only 
 whether the process is a Bot or not but also the kind of 
attack it may be engaging in.   
 
 Network Algorithm 
 
 The main objective of the Network Algorithm is to 
function as a central algorithm that examines the transport 
layer traffic, flow_data, captured from the entire enterprise 
network and try to find useful patterns of Bot behavior 
which can then be used by the individual nodes to detect 
Bot attacks with greater accuracy and efficiency. This 
algorithm is passive in nature and is activated by alerts from 
the Stand-Alone Algorithm. The various stages involved are 
as follows:   
 
Reception of Trigger Events: The algorithm receives 
triggers from the Stand-Alone Algorithm that conveys 
information such as originator machine IP address, Bot 
process detected, inbound and outbound ports and IP 
addresses of the infected hosts and the type of attack 
detected by Stand-Alone Algorithm.  
Identification of Machines with Suspected Behavior 
and Selection of Flow Records: Based on these triggers, 
the machines sending the trigger and remote host at the 
Inbound IP addresses are shortlisted as the machines with 
suspected behavior. This is followed by extraction of the 
subset from flow_data containing either of these IP 
addresses in the Source IP or Destination IP fields. This can 
be done by retrieving the information from the flow_data 
array for each host and performing search on the flow_data 
for the IP addresses.  
Identification of Suspected Conversations: To eliminate 
legitimate traffic, a two step process is used which consists 
of:  
 Packet Type Filtering: We select only those flow 
records in which the Packet Type is IRC, HTTP, TCP, 
UDP, and ICMP, as these are the protocols which are 
used by Bots and are indicative of a malicious activity. 
The type field in the flow_data indicates what type of 
traffic (TCP, UCP etc) we want to capture.  
 Port Filtering: Port based filtering is possible only in 
case of Bots that operate on standard ports, for example 
6667, 6668, 7000/tcp, (Karasaridis, Rexroad and 
Hoeflin, 2007;Wang, Sparks and Zou, 2007; 
Wicherskiat al., 2005). It is important to note that for 
most of the network based attacks like DDoS, the ports 
used for command invocation, controlling and the 
actual attack are not standard. They are dependent on 
the results of the network scanning phase. Moreover 
attackers use different ports for communication 
between  
o master and agent  
o attacker and master   
In fact, even the protocols used for the two conversations 
are different. The primary reason behind this is to avoid any 
correlations in port usage, (David Dittrich, 1999). For non-
standard cases, port filtering can however be done based on 
further analysis of the malicious flow_data captured.  
To detect Bots using non-standard ports:  
o We use the property that Bot controllers usually 
have one to many port connections with their 
targets, (Karasaridis, Rexroad and Hoeflin, 2007). 
o We find flow records between the suspected Bots 
and remote servers which have traffic 
characteristics within the bounds of a flow model 
for IRC traffic, (Karasaridis, Rexroad and Hoeflin, 
2007). 
 
Filtration of Suspected Conversations: From the 
identified suspect conversations we will obtain the most 
likely Bot conversations (command as well as activity 
conversations) using the following techniques in parallel. 
 Response time clustering: It has been observed that the 
response time between receptions of commands from 
Bot-master and initiation of malicious activity is 
substantially small compared to typical human IRC 
responses. Using this principle, we find response times 
for all suspected nodes in the network. We use K-
means clustering algorithm, to partition nodes having 
low response time. These partitioned nodes are 
considered for next filter phase. K-means clustering 
algorithm partitions n observations into k clusters in 
which each observation belongs to the cluster with the 
nearest mean.(K-means clustering) 
 Synchronization filtering: It has been observed that on 
reception of commands from same Bot-master all the 
zombie hosts initiate malicious activity at roughly the 
same time. Using this principle we consider all activity 
conversations that started at the similar time for the 
next phase. This can be achieved by analyzing 
flow_data snapshots, captured for all hosts in the n
th 
time
 
interval, for simultaneous abnormal activities. 
Analysis of filtered network traffic using Dynamic 
time warping: Bots involved in DDoS attacks like UDP, 
TCP or ICMP flood, produce network traffic having similar 
patterns. The challenge lies in trying to find a similarity 
score for such traffics. We use Dynamic Time Warping 
(DTW) algorithm, often used in speech recognition 
techniques, to find similarities in network traffic patterns 
generated by different hosts in a network. Dynamic time 
warping (DTW), is an algorithm that measures the similarity 
between two sequences which may vary in time or speed 
(Dynamic time warping; Elena Tsiporkova, Dynamic time 
warping). The rationale behind using this algorithm is as 
follows: 
 The sequences that can be compared using this 
algorithm may vary in time and speed. 
  The algorithm provides a non-linear (elastic) 
alignment, which produces a more intuitive similarity 
measure, allowing similar network traffic patterns to 
match even if they are out of phase across the time 
axis (Elena Tsiporkova, Dynamic time warping ). 
 The kind of sequences that DTW algorithm can 
analyze are similar to network traffic sequences we 
intent to analyze. 
 
The formula to calculate the similarity score for two 
sequences A, B having m, n data points respectively 
is as follows : 
 
∑ (  )    
 
   
 
    D (A, B) =  
∑  
 
   
 
 
   
(Elena Tsiporkova, Dynamic time warping) 
 
D: distance between sequences A and B  
d (Ps): distance between is and js .  
P is the function representing points across the optimized 
(least distance) path between the two sequences.  
ws > 0: weighting coefficient  
We use the weighting coefficient such that  
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Here C = n + m as we use the symmetric form for the 
weighting coefficient  
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We calculate the optimized value for D (A, B) using 
dynamic programming. Dynamic programming is a method 
for solving complex problems by breaking them down into 
simpler sub problems (Dynamic programming). We apply 
Dynamic programming in our calculation as follows: 
 
Initial condition: g (1, 1) = 2d (1, 1). 
 
 (   )     
 (     )   (   )
         (       )     (   )
 (     )    (   )
 
 
 
g (i,j) : min. value of function P at point (i,j)  
d (i,j) : Euclidian distance between point i of sequence1 and 
point j of sequence2.   
Thus if D (A, B) < D (B, C) then the sequences A 
and B are more similar as compared to sequences B and C. 
We have used 'packets/sec' as the metric, in this paper, for 
our experiments and analytical computations. It is important 
to note that the 'network traffic pattern analysis' step in the 
standalone algorithm compares network traffic generated 
with well-known and archived malicious network traffic 
patterns. In this step however, we analyze network traffic 
generated by hosts at run time and compare them with each 
other and not with a standard pattern. 
 Analysis of UDP traffic from two Bots performing 
UDP flood attack and an uninfected host having normal 
UDP traffic is as below. We have used the R-project‟s DTW 
package (Toni Giorgino, 2009) to compute the similarity 
scores i.e. D (A, B). We have used Wireshark (Wireshark) 
to capture UDP packets and to generate IO graphs for the 
same. We have considered 'packets/sec' captured from hosts 
at time steps of 5 seconds. 
 
Seq1: Bot involved in UDP flood attack. 
Seq2: Bot involved in UDP flood attack. 
Seq3: Normal uninfected host
                      
 D (A, B) = g (n, m) / C   
 
 
 
Analysis of Seq1 and Seq2: 
Seq1: [123, 2387, 2265, 2465, 2409, 2057, 257, 1334, 511, 2343, 2426, 2489, 2412, 1324, 784, 1213, 2334, 213, 734, 755] 
 
Seq2: [130, 153, 514, 2414, 2389, 2337, 2214, 2034, 1807, 1753, 1764, 2419, 2309, 2409, 2411, 2216, 2367, 2354, 1302, 456, 
2456, 1215, 1347, 1385, 124] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 Seq1, Bot involved in UDP flood attack  
 
 
 
Figure 5 Seq2, Bot involved in UDP flood attack 
 
 
D (Seq1, Seq2) = 8729 
 
 
Analysis of Seq1 and Seq3: 
 
Seq1: [123, 2387, 2265, 2465, 2409, 2057, 257, 1334, 511, 2343, 2426, 2489, 2412, 1324, 784, 1213, 2334, 213, 734, 755] 
 
Seq3: [11, 33, 25, 27, 103, 123, 124, 29, 63, 9, 52, 51, 53, 48, 23, 35, 33] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6 Seq3, Normal (legitimate) UDP traffic  
 
  
D (Seq1, Seq3) = 30689
In the above analysis D (Seq1, Seq2) < D (Seq1, Seq3), thus 
implying that Seq1 and Seq2 are more similar as compared 
to Seq3. This observation supports our proposition that 
„Bots involved in a particular type of attack produce similar 
network traffic pattern‟, since Seq1 and Seq2 are generated 
by Bots involved in UDP flood attack and Seq3 is generated 
by a normal uninfected host. 
 
 
Analysis of filtered conversations using graphical 
analysis and clustering: The conversations obtained from 
the union of results of the two filtration techniques will be 
analyzed to detect groups of compromised machines with 
similar communication patterns and similar malicious 
activity patterns. In this phase we also attempt to classify 
the type of malicious activity and finally generate a set of 
Bot signatures as well as soft black list. This phase consists 
of following three activities: 
 Graphical Analysis: We analyze the filtered 
conversations by constructing a weighted (directed) 
graph to represent the network traffic for all the hosts in 
the network for the n
th
 time interval. Nodes in the graph 
represent hosts in the network and edges represent 
network traffic between them. The weighted (directed) 
graph can be constructed by considering 
hostwise_weight_incoming and 
hostwise_weight_outgoing of the n
th
 flow_data in 
flow_data_array for each of the hosts in the network. 
Figure 7 shows a weighted (directed) graph constructed 
in a similar way. 
   
 
 
Figure 7 A weighted (directed) graph constructed using flow_data 
captures 
   
  
 In the above graph, weights assigned to edges are 
the TCP (or UDP) packet volume (outgoing or incoming 
based on the direction) for the hosts. The graph shows high 
weight values for outgoing edges emerging from some of 
the nodes (agents) and low values for incoming edges 
ending at them. This is indicative of a Bot carrying out a 
DDoS attack based on the commands invoked from its Bot-
master. We identify the nodes: 
 That have a high overall outgoing weight and low 
incoming weights. 
 That has incoming edges that correspond to TCP and 
UDP traffic carrying Bot commands (David Dittrich, 
1999). 
 
 It should be noted that the graph constructed above 
is not based on any simulations or real time network 
 statistics and is hence not conclusive. It is used to 
demonstrate: 
1. How to construct a network flow weighted graph based 
on the flow_data captured. 
2. How network traffic patterns like high O/I ratio 
concentrated in some regions of the network can be 
deduced from this graph.  
3. How the graph can be used to check if there is a high 
volume of outgoing malicious traffic from 
compromised hosts at about the same time. 
 
 Clustering: 
Command dimension clustering: This step mainly 
concentrates on the traffic flow data i.e. who is talking to 
whom? We filter out: 
 All flows that are directed from internal to external 
hosts. 
 Communications between internal hosts as well as 
communications, between hosts, that are not completely 
established (that contain only one way traffic). 
 Flows to known legitimate servers.  
We then use the following parameters to cluster the 
conversations (Guofei Gu et. al., 2008): 
 Number of flows per hour (fph) 
 Number of packets per flow(ppf) 
 Average number of bytes per packet(bpp) 
 Average number of bytes per second(bps) 
 Port number 
Activity dimension clustering: This step mainly concentrates 
on the activities that the hosts are involved in i.e. what are 
the hosts doing? We use a two layer clustering scheme. In 
the first layer, we cluster the conversations according to 
type of malicious activity. In the second layer we cluster the 
conversations according to activity features. The types of 
activities and the specific cluster features for each of them 
are as given below (Guofei Gu et. al., 2008): 
 Port scan activity: Features include rigorous attempts 
by Bots to find potential vulnerable ports on hosts 
within the same subnet. It also leads to high volume 
of failed connection attempts.  
 Spam activity: Two clients would be clustered 
together if they are using same SMTP connection 
destination. 
 Binary downloading activity: Features could include 
similar binary, similar URL, etc. 
 DDoS: Features include high bytes per packet, large 
number of flows per connection and high number of 
packets per sec 
 
Cross dimension correlation: We select one cluster from the 
command dimension and one cluster from the activity 
dimension and compute the cross correlation. This process 
is repeated for each pair of clusters in the command and 
activity dimensions. From these, we select those pairs that 
have high correlation. (Guofei Gu et. al., 2008). 
 
Issue of alerts: Based on the analysis of the 
standalone and network algorithm an alert is 
issued to take necessary measures. Also an alarm 
is issued to all hosts to download the latest 
signatures. 
 
 Summary 
 
In this paper we have proposed a novel two pronged 
approach to detect Botnets in a given network. We proposed 
a data structure that efficiently stores network flow data. 
This data structure is used for analysis in the standalone and 
network algorithm. The standalone algorithm is heuristic in 
nature whereas the network algorithm relies on network 
traffic analysis. The two pronged approach used in this 
paper helps to analyze the network captures effectively 
because the intensive network analysis, that require more 
effort is triggered only when standalone algorithm generates 
an alarm. Because of the two pronged approach, adopted the 
chances of false positives are reduced as the network 
algorithm is triggered only if the standalone algorithm raises 
an alarm. The analysis of network traffic flow, based on 
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm performed on 
experimental values showed positive results for similarity in 
Bot traffic patterns.  
 
 Future Work 
 
In future we intend to focus our efforts towards the 
following: 
 Implement a framework that effectively applies the 
suggested two pronged strategy to large scale real-time 
enterprise networks. We also intend to make this 
framework generic in terms of the parameters used to 
evaluate network activities as well as individual host 
activities. The main motive behind this is to ensure that 
this framework can cope up with new Bots and Botnet 
models that may evolve in the future. 
 Make our two pronged approach real time by using the 
Reval tool, suggested by (Vasudevan et al., 2006). 
 Reval is an operational support tool, used to mitigate 
the impact of network based attacks like DDoS. It can 
scale to large networks and detect abnormal network 
activities in real time.  
 The kind of network traffic flow data that is used by the 
network algorithm for network flow analysis is large, 
typically in gigabytes. Running the network algorithm 
on such huge volumes of data effectively is a challenge. 
We intend to apply various optimization techniques to 
efficiently analyze the network flow data. 
 Estimate the complexity of uploading the flow_data 
array to a specific node and computation complexity of 
extracting the occurrence of an attack in real time, 
using the Reval tool, (Vasudevan et al., 2006) to 
establish the feasibility of real-time detection. 
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